The Horn, the Gulf, and the Politics of Interdependence

00:00:17: Hello everyone and welcome to the ninth episode of What's Up?

00:00:20: The Africa-West Asia podcast, part of CarPost.

00:00:24: West Asia & Sub Sahara African Partnerships in Flux Project.

00:00:28: My name is Desiree And I'm one your hosts.

00:00:31: and the wider Red Sea region.

00:00:49: We welcome Hafsa Halawa, Independent Consultant & Mediation Expert And Dr.

00:00:56: Asnake Chani, Political Scientist & Associate Fellow at Carpo.

00:01:01: Hafsa Asnaki Welcome to the podcast.

00:01:05: Thank you so much for having me!

00:01:07: Thanks For Having The Opportunity.

00:01:12: Welcome to the both of you.

00:01:14: So Hafsa, if we could start with you discussions about The Horn and the Gulf are often framed in terms of competition influence or external intervention as We have talked about In this podcast previously yet today?

00:01:28: We would like to focus on interdependence.

00:01:31: from your perspective How Would You characterize the relationship between the horn of Africa And the gulf Today And what makes these two regions increasingly interconnected?

00:01:43: Thank you, Desiree and thank you for the question.

00:01:46: I think primarily what makes them interconnected... ...and it's something that is lost in conversational lock because of sometimes mismatched or perceived mismatch of influence….

00:01:58: …or money-or territorial size—is plain geography!

00:02:04: We talk a lot, especially I'm sitting here in Nairobi talking to you.

00:02:08: There's a lot of talk about what is the region?

00:02:11: The neighborhood and external actors And by-and large for the Gulf States particularly A Gulf state like Saudi Arabia.

00:02:20: It occupies the entirety of the eastern coasts of Red Sea.

00:02:24: So when you look at red sea politics, red sea dynamics everything from maritime environment economics trade logistics this is an incredibly interconnected region.

00:02:35: wider by virtue its geography It's also interconnected because of its historical trade routes, ancient trade routes.

00:02:45: Ancient political engagement including colonialism before sort of not just the more recent waves of colonialism but pre-independence

00:02:56: etc.,

00:02:58: fundamentally because a changing characteristic in global geopolitics.

00:03:04: We have, for the better part of the last certainly three years but arguably over the last decade seen what I would characterize as a shifting perspective in its foreign policy globally including it's own power projection across world notably this wider region to one that is today characterized more by limitations be that hard military power or general foreign policy, political power.

00:03:37: And the weakness is exposed by that.

00:03:39: so within that decade we've had emerging powers across the region.

00:03:44: in The Gulf for example We have significant transfers of power to a largely new generation Of leaders and New Generation of Foreign Policy A region that now looks far beyond its immediate neighborhood, That being sort of the Iraq war fulcrum if you will.

00:04:03: their national security should be constructed.

00:04:06: And now, of course today we're talking eight months into an ongoing war stalemate situation between largely the US and Iran.

00:04:18: We see the interconnectivity physically Between Hormuz, Babel Mendeb Gulf of Suez Mediterranean Be it off to The Atlantic or through to Indian Ocean beyond Asia.

00:04:31: And there is a new highlight and a new spotlight on not just different trade routes, and sovereignty of trade.

00:04:40: And sovereignty of waters but also sovereignty of coastal areas logistics and resources.

00:04:47: that has come in an era of fluctuating commitments to diversification away from fossil fuels, it's come at a time of diversification in the global economy shifting far more towards Asia and terms of dependency.

00:05:01: And certainly in terms of massive demographic and wealth boom across large part North East Africa to keep our region as well huge political upheaval If you look at the kind of political changes we've seen across the wider region that has been interwoven into foreign policy, politics and their quote geoeconomics.

00:05:26: Thank you very much Hafsa for setting up context.

00:05:30: as Naki I'm wondering from a Horn of Africa perspective what does interdependence between the horn and golf actually looks like in practice?

00:05:41: What sort of connections do you see as the most significant today?

00:06:11: But in practice, this interdependence operates through different channels.

00:06:16: And the most important and probably their first one could be ports in maritime security.

00:06:22: The Gulf states in general have very strong interest in ports in the maritime corridors In countries such as Djibouti, the Djiboute port, the Raleh container which was established and financed by the United Arab Emirates In Somalia and the Berbera, in the DP world for example invested four hundred fifty million dollars.

00:06:46: that supports development.

00:06:47: In Eritrea as a port it used to be used by United Arab Emirates in its fight against Yemeni.

00:06:58: So because of so straight roots in the public element there is an economic interdependence between the regions, and secondly there is also trade investment as well as food security.

00:07:13: The United Arab Emirates for example has about forty seven billion dollars in investment in the wider eastern western Africa region And mostly it's in the Korma Africa followed by Saudi Arabia which has invested about fifteen point six billion dollars.

00:07:31: You might be aware of about the banana-based initiative, which was initiated by the United Arab Emirates to secure agricultural lands in the Horn of Africa and investing food security.

00:07:46: The Gulf countries are also markets for livestock and agricultural products that originated from the Horn region And a Gulf investment obviously provides capital for infrastructure, agriculture logistic and other sectors.

00:08:02: There's also a human dimension when it comes to this interdependence, there is migration in remittance which connects millions of people from the Honeoparticle to the Gulf economy.

00:08:14: thousands of people every year have traveled through the Gulf regions as they deliver to complete delivery shortage.

00:08:22: And finally there are also security and political dimensions if we see conflict between Yemen currently in Sudan Somalia, together with the tension around the rest of the region and ongoing war between Iran in the United States.

00:08:37: Those developments show that insecurity on one side is increasingly affecting other ones.

00:08:45: so for me there's an interdependence between those two regions because it could be asymmetric interdependences military resources, technological resources while the whole of Africa being strategic, jewellery, ports and labour markets in natural resources.

00:09:10: Thank you, Asnake.

00:09:11: You just mentioned some dimensions of the interdependencies between two regions but I know that much.

00:09:18: your research has also focused on development cooperation between Gulf countries and states in the Horn of Africa.

00:09:26: so my question to you is how has Gulf engagement changed the development landscape over the past decade?

00:09:34: And what are the implications that this has had for governance and political legitimacy?

00:09:41: Yes, it's also an important dimension when we see the relationship between the Gulf States in the Horn of Africa.

00:09:48: It is not only about economy but also about importance there as well as a political question, government and political questions.

00:09:55: so over the past decades I think gulf engagement has expanded in the horn of Africa by introducing capital infrastructure investments and quality partnership, which is outside the traditional Western donor framework.

00:10:12: Which completely comes from the traditional western donor and recipient relationship.

00:10:17: so this has created opportunities to undertake various projects in the whole of Africa that might be very difficult to finance if a girl finance was not there.

00:10:26: So from the development perspective The golf engagements should not simply be characterized as an external interference that also creates real economic opportunity.

00:10:38: However, there is a point here much of the Gulf engagement has been highly at true states political-driven relationship The agreement since project agreements for example are often negotiated between political leaders and owned companies and investors with relatively limited parliamentary checkup in oversight.

00:11:01: One interesting example could be right here.

00:11:04: In Ethiopia, for example there is a called the Chakab project which has been built with about ten to fifteen billion dollars around Al-Isarbaba and nobody knows how this product is being financed.

00:11:17: And the Prime Minister of Yemen was asked during the parliamentary session on the source income from this huge project.

00:11:26: His answer was quite extraordinary.

00:11:28: He said that Since we are not using public money, it is just none of your business.

00:11:34: So that was like a direct answer to the parliamentary members and that shows us this kind of project which obviously financed by the United Arab Emirates lack the Parliamentary Checkup, the Public Oversight.

00:11:49: so This has important implications for political legitimacy.

00:11:53: governments can gain when you know get financial support or these jobs or foreign exchange if those are producing economic benefits.

00:12:02: But at the same time, if citizens perceive that this kind of agreement primarily benefit the political elites for investors or particular regions and communities The same projects can generate kind of grievance in undermined political legitimacy and governance.

00:12:19: Thank you very much Asnaki Hafsa.

00:12:21: If we're looking from the Gulf side of the Red Sea Would you say motivates these partnerships with the Horn?

00:12:31: And to what extent?

00:12:33: are they being driven by economic opportunity, or by broader strategic political and security considerations.

00:12:42: Thank You!

00:12:43: Yeah I mean for the Gulf countries that is always in a large part an interconnected approach.

00:12:49: it's not sort of purely economic interest that isn't also driven by or includes within it various security considerations, strategy strategic depth and political considerations.

00:13:04: I think really what motivates their large investment particularly the massive increase in the last sort of ten to fifteen years has been both resource-driven In terms not just diversifying there own economies but ensuring they keep a pace with reflected changes in the sort of global economy, but also having strategic control and strategic depth to be able to project beyond their neighborhood.

00:13:31: We've seen in the last seven eight months the importance To quote some people that choke hold That is created around a global economy when something like hormones The state of hormones is disrupted closed or certainly suspended.

00:13:47: And That ripple effect across the globe has shown us not only how dependent the world remains on natural resources that come from the Gulf countries, but also primarily how much of global economy is condensed and confined to this one major waterway.

00:14:07: And the same can be said as well of obviously other major transit routes, but the Babelmandeb Suez Mediterranean link is just as critical and critically important to the global economy even if primarily it's not just about moving Gulf natural resources.

00:14:26: What's on offer in The Horn is a large demographic pool of workers.

00:14:33: there's a large high number of people across the Horn who work and live in The Gulf, support domestic economies.

00:14:41: In all kinds of positions And help that economy to grow because these are by-and large countries with small populations But at the same time their resources and strategic location literal states of Red Sea allows investment opportunity That would insert itself into wider strategy and security objectives of these states.

00:15:05: And that comes with an understanding for some, that power projection needs to be wider than the immediate neighborhood and wider then their immediate geography allows.

00:15:17: Having a foothold having strategic investment in strategic relationship towards North Africa including here Sudan and Egypt allow us much larger than just oil producing states.

00:15:35: There's been a lot of debate over the elevation or the term middle powers, and as to fit into the context how I initially framed this.

00:15:44: when you do see sort of shifting narrative on geopolitics What we've seen arguably in the last couple of years is, in some respects and perspectives The Horn Of Africa And The Red Sea has become part and parcel for a wider free-for-all effectively.

00:16:05: For power influence resource mobilization political consideration driven by economic interest.

00:16:15: but I find them very much intertwined anywhere, really.

00:16:18: And we've seen the Gulf countries notably the UAE catch up to China which has historically or suddenly over the last twenty-thirty years been a largest single investor on the continent.

00:16:32: and now in many countries The UAE is caught up to that.

00:16:35: you see other countries like Saudi Arabia adding to that Turkey for example in Somalia.

00:16:41: And now you have much more open competition, and rather than collaboration.

00:16:48: it is certainly manifesting at the moment as a more opened competition which then drives these broader strategic objectives because they can shift very quickly to become confrontational.

00:17:01: Possibly even drivers of conflict or certain instability that's largely owing for a number of countries investing or engaging with the Horn of Africa are one in the same.

00:17:18: So what we have is narratives that are emerging, but they're becoming enlarged part zero sum and That's sort of why the trajectory seems more troubled than it has in the past.

00:17:32: Thank you Hafsa.

00:17:33: You're describing an environment in which competition seems to be the most stronger trend rather than cooperation, nevertheless you have worked also on water diplomacy and your research opportunities for regional cooperation.

00:17:49: And I'm wondering

00:17:50: when

00:17:50: we look at water diplomacy how do you think that this trend will develop?

00:17:55: Will it become important in shaping relations between the Horn of Africa and the Gulf and also Egypt in the coming

00:18:02: years?".

00:18:04: So i think its a very thin line and strategic cooperation between literal states, be they countries that share the Red Sea or countries that shared the Nile in Africa.

00:18:18: And national security... ...and certainly for these countries.

00:18:25: as you mentioned Egypt.

00:18:27: obviously the elephant is the GERD built in Ethiopia, and the ongoing negotiations and attempts at coming to a trans-boundary water management agreement between Egypt and Ethiopia primarily over the Nile.

00:18:43: It's still for me the primary driver of competition in the region.

00:18:50: I think that something that has been lost in both mediation efforts but also analysis from across the Horn and up to North Africa,

00:19:02: etc.,

00:19:03: is that there has been no major resolution on this question.

00:19:07: And it's now spilling over into a wide number of security arenas including in contribution And the Gulf states have inserted themselves in that too.

00:19:19: The broader Middle East, North Africa region is most water scarce region in the world with their highest number of waterscares.

00:19:27: countries and sort And water scarcity and water usage are major political issues, be they domestically or regionally.

00:19:38: By enlarge that then makes them security issue.

00:19:41: so what we failed to do in the frame of auto diplomacy I think some senior diplomats have attempted this particularly between Egypt and Ethiopia.

00:19:51: but there were other comparative examples if you go towards Iraq for example Turkey Iran etc.

00:19:58: is we have failed to really look at how securitized the question of water security and water dependency, in this course that are struggling for or fighting.

00:20:12: for control over water resources.

00:20:15: And what is happening in the broader region, that it's merging into a broader competition of territorial control.

00:20:24: and if you look at the merging Gerd built upon the Sudan war, built up on ongoing tensions between Egypt and Ethiopia.

00:20:36: Built upon The Red Sea And control of the red sea You know statements from for example the Ethiopian Prime Minister On seeking sovereign access to the Red Sea Mass investment From the Gulf states across the Red sea As well as other States.

00:20:51: Then you see this sort Of layered approach Where we have not conducively approached this issue in a more holistic fashion, and therefore we fail to understand that whilst I deny the existence of purely water-driven wars as some in the environmental space have talked about.

00:21:15: But rather than talking very interconnectedly politics and diplomacy.

00:21:24: And what happens, and has happened certainly over the last eight to nine years between Egypt and Ethiopia—and sticking on this point because it is a big dominant question of water security in the region—is that we failed to acknowledge how much the politics at home have shifted... ...and how much now the reliance on positions taken vis-a-vis water security are politically existential for the two leaders respectively in quite a zero-sum fashion, be that President Sisi and Egypt.

00:21:56: Be that Prime Minister Abbey in

00:21:58: Addis.".

00:21:59: And so we're unable to provide fresh diplomatic approaches as to how to bring these two nations to a sustainable détente or some kind of arrangement where development cooperation supersedes security concerns—as it were because How much the politics has changed and how much now, not to call it a scapegoat but how much water security is part of their political survival.

00:22:31: Their political project and national legitimacy.

00:22:35: in there own context.

00:22:37: unless until we acknowledge that in our diplomacy, acknowledge that research efforts to be able shape new forms of mediation This is going to be an underlying issue, either at the Nile or the Red Sea.

00:22:53: Not just between Egypt and Ethiopia but within literal states.

00:22:58: writ large.

00:22:59: that doesn't allow us then conquer rising instability questions... ...and move towards de-escalation and

00:23:07: cooperation.".

00:23:09: Thank you very much Hafsa!

00:23:11: Listening it strikes me as The story here is more than just about water alone.

00:23:18: That it's also about nationalism, state legitimacy but also competing visions of regional order.

00:23:26: and I'm wondering Asinake taking off from that point when you look at the debates around Ethiopia and Egypt as a concerns the GERD how do you see this debate playing out?

00:23:40: How does development and regional politics evolving in this context.

00:23:56: but it's connected to the question of economic development, energy security, poverty and regional power.

00:24:20: And Ethiopia in the Grand Ethiopian Rains Amsterdam illustrates this very clearly.

00:24:27: from an Ethiopian perspective The GERD is fundamentally a development project because Ethiopia has enormous development needs and also hyperpowers have been seen as critical for expanding electricity access, industrialization and regional energy trade.

00:24:46: But however the world has become a powerful symbol of Ethiopia's rights to use its natural resource for development or economic developments.

00:24:56: during the inauguration there was speech made by one of the Korean leaders who attended the ceremony in which he was describing the Terbado Prime Minister So, describing GERD as the second adwa in Kuala Lumpur with.

00:25:12: a lot of us are familiar about Adwa.

00:25:16: The victory for Italian colonial power during the king's many weeks ago.

00:25:25: The GERd has become a powerful symbol of future peace right to use its natural resource for development.

00:25:30: so besides economic benefit or outcome that is also national pride narrative control and projecting power.

00:25:40: That's what I find particularly important here is the group has exposed also a different political question, Havza was talking about the failure of diplomacy in resolving our differences or difference between the holonophobic states as well as the Middle East countries who are particularly European Egypt.

00:26:03: so... The thing is historically Nile politics has been developed within a highly unequally institutional and geopolitical framework.

00:26:12: Egypt was obviously the

00:26:13: dominant power,

00:26:15: but then the government came in it had challenged established order And he has shifted some of the bargaining power towards Ethiopia or the upstream countries.

00:26:26: But that's the long-term solution.

00:26:28: cannot be based on one country winning another one is losing.

00:26:34: The geography itself makes the cooperation unavoidable, so... The policy question has to be the move or the policy discussion from simply water sharing through benefits-sharing.

00:26:47: So that have been national pride for Ethiopia a couple of years now.

00:26:53: but at the same time it's also a tension between Egypt and Ethiopia in that has really changed through diplomatic means.

00:27:00: Thank you Asnaki.

00:27:02: Hafsa, moving back to you we just mentioned Egypt in the context of Nile politics but could you tell us more about Egypt's role within that evolving relationship between The Horn Of Africa and the Gulf more broadly?

00:27:18: Sure I mean something does get a bit lost.

00:27:22: is Of all the sort of theatres or neighbourhoods that Egypt has had a consistent policy on under the leadership of President Sisi, it's been The Horn in East Africa.

00:27:35: President Sici came to power very much looking at Africa as a neighbourhood where He sought to reset Egypt's role, he reset Egypt relationship as Macke has well pointed out.

00:27:49: that does and include in his enlarged part about also sort of regional Agomon competition.

00:27:56: Not just vis-a-vis Ethiopia but obviously the major part of this.

00:28:00: But primarily you know President Sisi has approached the wider Horn region very much as pivotal to Egypt's own development and strategic depth, has its other borders east-and west.

00:28:17: You know there's been under President Mubarak.

00:28:19: in a previous regime, Egypt had effectively abandoned Africa almost entirely under the Camp David Accords but fundamentally looked towards its eastern neighborhood, it's Eastern borders.

00:28:44: And that has significantly changed under President Sisi.

00:28:47: so we've seen Reams of security cooperation agreements economic corporation agreements with a number of countries Sudan South Sudan Djibouti Kenya Uganda and so on and so forth And that has really been a major driving force Of this regime in terms of how it reasserts itself In the region.

00:29:08: So many ways I view Egypt's role as being quite separate from The Gulf, and it is important to remember that Egypt.

00:29:17: Egypt sits on the continent, Egypt's border with Sudan is a significant land border over twelve hundred kilometers and it has historically had very strong relationships with the Sudanese regimes that have come.

00:29:32: And of course now does play a role in the ongoing conflict.

00:29:36: Of course there's Red Sea-Literal state this was Canal and its coastal states with the Red Sea In terms of its relationships in the Horn of Africa and the Gulf, up until I'd say the latter half of this Sudan War.

00:29:53: certainly in the last eighteen months or so these were quite compartmentalized relationships.

00:29:58: The relationship with the Gulf has been in the past decade an imbalanced dependency primarily on financial support, investment from the Gulf keeping Egypt's books in order if you will owing to poor fiscal management at home.

00:30:15: And that has now manifested in the fact that whilst Egypt is seeking to project power and strategic depth across The Horn it's unable beyond a certain limit In part because of limitations placed by its domestic economic regular domestic economic crises.

00:30:36: Its relationship with the Gulf is also quite interlinked with ongoing politics in the Middle East, notably of course in the last three and a half years or the last two years sorry The War In Gaza And the Ongoing war in the Gulf With Iran.

00:30:52: That has placed Egypt both.

00:30:54: as you know it's allowed to exercise a role To be useful to various states, but it's also allowed Egypt to carve itself a little bit out of that space.

00:31:06: Egypt has found its self-isolated of late and I think that is contributing to a more...I wouldn't call an independent but certainly less harmonious policy in the region But i don't see as being something significantly diverged from what egypt position had been over these last thirteen years under this regime It's very much been a consistent policy in the Horn.

00:31:31: However, just to point out I would note that beyond Egypt's relationships with the Gulf... ...I would highlight Egypt's relationship with Turkey and the last two years of the accelerated rapprochement between Egypt and Turkey….

00:31:45: …very much built on a strategic and security relationship trade etc.

00:31:50: was always ongoing between countries even during diplomatic suspension of ties.

00:31:54: I think that's been quite not only influential in terms of the direction of regional and foreign policy, but it has had a major influence on domestic and neighbourhood dynamics.

00:32:09: It has changed the landscape somewhat over the Horn of Africa, it is a country that commits to and seeks to commit this question-of territorial integrity.

00:32:28: And sees as major requirement for regional stability security in its own.

00:32:36: A lot of Egypt's foreign policy has been about domestic political security.

00:32:42: making sure there isn't knock on spillover effect creates instability at home.

00:32:52: And that's not just a territorial question, it goes beyond the borders.

00:32:55: and now of late final point I think Egypt is seeking to insert itself more in broader investment landscape.

00:33:03: so you do see Egypt engaging much more bilateral investment deals.

00:33:08: earlier this year we saw deal signed with Djibouti at Dorrelay, the Ministry of Transport and the government in Egypt on everything from solar energy to other forms of port development.

00:33:22: We also see an increase of goods and trading between say Egypt and Kenya.

00:33:28: And you do see recently that Egypt seeks to take advantage of various opportunities with the Chinese to try and create this role not just as an energy hub, a transit hub or gas hub.

00:33:44: With its LNG terminals on it's supply chain but also trying to create a position for itself at major part in the supply chain across North East Africa.

00:33:55: And that is generally always too fluctuating.

00:34:02: levels of success no doubt But certainly you can see how Egypt seeks to carve out a larger regional presence for itself in the Horn of Africa.

00:34:13: Thank You Hafsa, as your speaking one thing stands out To me The interconnected nature Of this regional dynamics The way Egypt's engagement with the horn is developing.

00:34:28: I think that it going to be risky for anyone to continue to understand Egypt's engagement with the region solely through questions like denial or the guard.

00:34:39: I think it clearly also involves economic partnerships, evolving ties with Gulf states even Cairo's rapprochement with actors such as Turkey and i think all of this really shaped the wider regional landscape.

00:34:56: How are these developments viewed?

00:34:58: Is Egypt increasingly seen as a partner, a competitor or something in between and do this?

00:35:04: overlapping political an economic ties suggests that a genuine Red Sea regional order is beginning to take shape.

00:35:13: Or do national interests still set the limits of cooperation?

00:35:17: I think Egypt's role in the Horn of Africa is perceived quite different ways depending on which countries you are talking about or which issue we're raising.

00:35:26: So if we talk, for example Somalia in Eritrea Egypt has a good relationship and it's trying to use these two countries to project its power into the Horn of Africa against Ethiopia.

00:35:39: And then when we talked about Ethiopia is quite contrary.

00:35:43: so We have to understand that Egypt is clearly an important African university power And it has a legitimate strategic interest in the Horn of Africa, particularly regarding the Nile or security trade and regional stability.

00:35:59: But from the Ethiopian perspective however their relationship as I have already said is more complicated.

00:36:04: There's an historical perception that Egypt has unfairly dominated the Niled River narrative and monopolization of water resource and especially Egypt's previous government is framing of Nile as an existential threat.

00:36:23: And a red line that should not be caused by any other upstream countries has been well-taken among the Ethiopian people, as well as the wider African states in general.

00:36:36: That brought diplomatic isolation for Cairo quite sometimes but recently Egypt is trying to rebrand its image by investing on water developments, for example in Tanzania.

00:36:49: Recently they have inaugurated a very big dam in Tanzanya which was completely built by the Egypt's contractors.

00:36:55: there has been also water development in South Sudan, India.

00:37:00: Egypt is trying to rebrand it's image because Ethiopia has been accusing Egypt as countries that had been unfairly using the Nile river with the colonial tweeters.

00:37:10: so Egypt is trying to remove that kind of image.

00:37:16: and there's also a considerable growing role of Gulf states in the Nile politics.

00:37:21: Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates Qatar and others have now substantial economic and political relationships across the whole and Ethiopia and Egypt still for interact not only bilaterally but within much wider let's see diplomatic environment.

00:37:38: So this creates both opportunities, as well as the risk.

00:37:42: One of things is that countries can potentially act at a beach between the two states or between upstream and downstream countries because they have significant relationship with Cairo and Addis Alova in having an interest in the refugee stability.

00:37:57: but changing their partnership can also complicate regional politics when all states interpret these relationships through the lens.

00:38:07: From the policy perspective, I think there should be a certain point where to see very at sea as a system of computing alignment rather than engagement which become a platform for dialogue and economic interdependence other than geopolitical polarization.

00:38:25: So conclude just perception in the Horn of Africa depends on what country we are talking about.

00:38:31: it issue were raising from the Japan perspective is more complicated than we probably thought.

00:38:39: That is very interesting, We are slowly moving to the end of this episode.

00:38:44: so I would like both you looking ahead for next decade.

00:38:50: What one development in horn golf relations that policy makers and researchers should pay much more attention?

00:38:59: So, I

00:39:04: think for me it's going to sound a little bit outside of quote horn golf specifically but i think something that is very much underpriced and not getting enough attention and focus.

00:39:18: It sort-of twofold...and for me they're one in.

00:39:20: the same One Is The Increasing Militarization Of The Red Sea itself in terms of not just the role, if they armed non-state actors like The Hothys that general military build up presence Of Actors be They Literal States or Non-Literal states In the Red Sea.

00:39:39: and tied into That which I think is very much a question for inter gulf relations Inditor horn And Horn Gulf Relations Is the Role of Israel and the role that Israel plays, the role which Israel seeks to play.

00:39:53: And its own strategic projections in The Red Sea obviously now were defined as a representation of the recent recognition of Somaliland.

00:40:07: But broadly speaking, this expanding footprint and engagement I think is something that will shape much of the next decade in the same way.

00:40:19: And those questions are very relevant for other parts

00:40:35: And from my perspective also, one development that I think which is underestimated the great intention regarding my time at the point of Africa particularly Ethiopia search for access to the sea.

00:40:50: But as we interpret it's a well-disciplined landlocked country and from the European perspectives this has been not only an economic problem but also strategic failureity.

00:41:01: so there access to the sea, and have an independent port.

00:41:10: But there is a possibility of military or projecting military power onto the sovereign state in the whole of Africa to achieve this objective.

00:41:21: It could be in Somalia and it would also be in Eritrea.

00:41:24: And that's very dangerous because when ports are being connected through sovereignty, nationalism The interests of multiple regional and local factors become very problematic and bilateral disputes between Eritrea and Ethiopia could probably become a wider regional crisis.

00:41:47: So for me the understanding issue right now is Ethiopia's request for multi-maxes, and the failure of diplomacy in addressing this issue.

00:41:58: Turkey has been mediating between Ethiopia and Somalia but it have never materialized.

00:42:03: so if we to externalize these kind of solutions, my time access couldn't become one the most stabilizing geopolitical questions in the Hono Papika probably in the coming years.

00:42:15: Hafsa and Asinake thank you both very much for joining us and for sharing your insights.

00:42:23: what I'm taking out on this conversation today is how difficult it has become to think about a horn the Gulf and the wider Red Sea region in isolation, right?

00:42:32: But issues that we've discussed from investment to water governance on regional politics all of them point to a growing reality of interdependence.

00:42:42: And I think the challenge for policymakers and opportunity for researchers is better understand how these connections are reshaping their regions what they mean for shared futures of the societies on both sides of the Red Sea as well.

00:42:59: So thank you very much!

00:43:01: Thank you so much, it's been a pleasure.

00:43:04: Thanks for having us.

00:43:05: It was great to have this kind with you

00:43:10: And thanks our listeners For joining todays episode.

00:43:14: Don't forget to follow Carpo on LinkedIn and Instagram To stay up-to-date On future episodes and publications from The Wasapp

00:43:22: Project.