Two Shores, One Sea: The Horn of Africa and West Asia in a Contested Red Sea

00:00:17: Hello everyone and welcome to the seventh episode of WASAP, The Africa-West Asia Podcast.

00:00:23: Part of Carpo's West Asia & Sub Sahara African Partnerships in Flux Project – the acronym for which is WASAP!

00:00:32: My name is Desiree Custors.

00:00:33: I'm a project manager with Carpo and one your hosts today.

00:00:38: And my name is Yuber Kinko Senior Researcher at Carpo.

00:00:43: Today, we are joined by someone who really needs little introduction to anyone following the Horn of Africa.

00:00:50: Alan Boswell, horn-of-Africa director at International Crisis Group and host for his podcast The Horn.

00:00:59: Alan welcome!

00:01:00: And given how many hours you spent asking questions on your own show it's a real pleasure.

00:01:12: Thanks for having me.

00:01:14: So Alan, before we get into some of the details on dynamics in The Horn I'm wondering if you could set this scene for our listeners?

00:01:22: For many years The Horn was largely analyzed by its own terms but today it's hard to separate from the gulf and wider Red Sea region.

00:01:32: When did that shift happen in your view And what does change about how should read the regions conflicts

00:01:40: Sure.

00:01:41: Well, I think when we talk about the Horn of Africa that as a region of focus is clearly something That came about in the European colonial and post-colonial period And then subsequently after and this division between African coasts and The Arabian side separated by the Red Sea Is clearly something that is A historical from a broader lens but is a division that seems to have gotten cemented in the latter half of the twentieth century and up until the beginning of the twenty-first century.

00:02:15: Now, of course there was a lot of links culturally culinary wise linguistically ethnically across The Red Sea.

00:02:25: it is interesting though that the main parts of the Arabian Peninsula had a lot Of links to the Horn of Africa.

00:02:31: are you know more on the Yemen side On the Omani Side on the Hijaz side of the Saudi Arabian coast, but the Gulf powers as we now think of them that are the real powers of the Arabian Peninsula.

00:02:44: Those countries links to the Horn of Africa not as strong as those coastal ones in the Indian Ocean and Red Sea Side I mentioned.

00:02:53: so the Saudi family comes from the interior of Saudi Arabia.

00:02:56: then off course we have Gulf powers centered on the Persian Gulf on the other side.

00:03:00: So I think there's some old and there are some new in this, i think people who say that these are just all-old relations that are coming back to the floor...I don't think that's quite the story!

00:03:08: There is definitely a story of modernity and rising powers as well in it.

00:03:13: but I think the main shift in narrative really started when we talk about The Gulf And The Horn ,and This Bigger Red Sea Region .

00:03:21: You'd have probably look after the Arab Spring especially during this very first what many call the GCC crisis, but essentially The Blockade on Qatar that occurred from about twenty eighteen to twenty-twenty.

00:03:36: and That's when I think you saw the real competition Between in among Gulf countries really start to come to the fore in the Horn of Africa.

00:03:44: And then we've seen a lot of shifts ever since them.

00:03:46: But that's when the narrative.

00:03:48: I think really really picked up.

00:03:51: Thank You very much Alan.

00:03:52: I'm wondering where you look at the fallout from the war Iran and the pressure on the Red Sea shipping lanes now.

00:04:01: How much of these shifts can we ascribe to this reality?

00:04:07: Well, the war in Iran or US-Israeli War is... of massive consequence to the whole region and is a strategic disaster for the Arab Gulf countries in particular.

00:04:18: And I think, The full fallout from that will be difficult to predict but we can say pretty clearly it'll be seismic.

00:04:25: Um...the effect on various Gulf countries also not symmetrical at even Saudi Arabia isn't enclosed or trapped by the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz as some others because also is on the Red Sea, and then the UAE and Oman have an easier time bypassing the Strait of Hormuz for instance than Qatar Kuwait or Bahrain.

00:04:51: So geography isn't uniform yet they're all deeply affected as we've seen.

00:04:57: Iranian links to the Houthis therefore to the red sea are not something you can disconnect from the strait.

00:05:05: Overall, it looks like this new state of insecurity in the region and the ability to block maritime transport exiting the Red Sea towards Asia as well as the Strait of Hormuz.

00:05:17: I think that's a new reality for some time.

00:05:22: And the implications of that, for the Horn of Africa I think will be quite significant as well and i think the most prominent of that besides all the downstream consequences.

00:05:31: economically a lot of struggles in terms of importing food and fertilizer and exporting goods and rising prices but other than also the strategic importance has massively been amplified.

00:05:47: And I think also just a general sense of insecurity in the region and a sense that every country is going to have to take a much closer look at how to secure their own interests within the region, especially given the necessary rethinking the United States as a security umbrella, all of that I think generally speaking is going to really intensify what we've already seen as a Security scramble taking place in this region over the last few years.

00:06:19: Alam?

00:06:19: I'm wondering since you mentioned how The Gulf Crisis was one of causes for narrative shifting around the Red Sea Region.

00:06:30: I would like to focus a little bit more on the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which was for a long time managed as quiet rivalry within a partnership but has accumulated in an open rivalry with reports of Saudi strikes on Emirati-linked targets in Yemen at the end of twenty five.

00:06:53: So i'm wondering if you could say about how we got this point?

00:06:58: And how much of this rivalry now converges on Sudan?

00:07:04: So the Gulf dynamics have been very fluid, especially from a perspective of those in the Horn of Africa.

00:07:12: During the Gulf crisis previously you had Saudi Arabia and UAE both working together to push back against the Qataris, blockade them in the Gulf itself but then also work together to kind of push against Qatari influence and the broader region including in the Horn of Africa as well.

00:07:31: And we saw the Saudis and Emirates working quite closely for a few years.

00:07:36: up until very recently They worked together to broker, for instance a rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea after Prime Minister Abbey came into power.

00:07:47: Of course Ethiopian Eritreia are now at odds again but that was something we saw them work together on.

00:07:52: they also worked very closely together in Sudan After the fall of Bashir stepping in providing clear support towards the military junta And this was before the war that Sudan is currently at so Disagreements and rivalry, sometimes competition between the two is of course not only on The Horn Of Africa.

00:08:14: There are numerous... disagreements and also just natural economic competition that takes place, including disagreement about the hegemonic position of Saudi Arabia vis-a-vis other Gulf countries for instance as well.

00:08:26: But in The Horn it seems to me that the divergence recently has obviously been primarily focused on Sudan which I'll talk about in a second but not only.

00:08:36: Sudan –the other major overlapping issue–has ben the UAE's huge investment And that then has also overlaid on questions of the Red Sea.

00:08:50: Both Ethiopia and the UAE are not ON THE RED SEA itself, and you've increasingly seen Saudi Arabia focus on building an alliance of red sea literal countries including by forming The Red Sea Council which is NOT been active but I think aspirationally shows how the Saudis and others, including the Egyptian Sea.

00:09:12: The Red Sea properly being governed in that excludes UAE And it excludes Ethiopia and this push from Ethiopia to regain sea access together with Addis Ababa's strong alliance with Abu Dhabi.

00:09:26: That I think is a second really major factor besides the Sudan War.

00:09:30: In the Sudan war itself This has been something like a slow boil.

00:09:36: When the war started, as I mentioned both Saudi Arabia and the UAE had ties to... ...both the Sunnis army and the RSF in the military junta.

00:09:46: Both of them had ties with the RSV going back into their war in Yemen where Omar al-Bashir sent tens of thousands of RSV fighters.. ..to fight on the Saudi and Emirati side against the Houthis.

00:09:59: And that was when Hemeti was able to sort of forge all these foreign ties bigger in a way than just paramilitary leader from western Sudan.

00:10:09: He started to build his own foreign relations, so they were not massively diverged when this war started on Sudan.

00:10:16: however once the war broke out we saw the UAE clearly step-in as the main backer and patron of the RSF And the Saudis tried to mediate between the army and the rsf but it did So really without wanting to necessarily include the UAE, for instance during the Jeddah negotiations.

00:10:38: And then over time, the Saudis have really shifted more or less neutral towards being arguably the strongest backer of the Sunnis army and the Saudies have grown increasingly infuriated at what they view as the UAe huge backing toward the RSF which they think threatens huge instability on their Western perimeter especially in eastern Sudan.

00:11:00: So those, the tensions in Sudan have definitely been one that I think has caused the rivalry and the tensions to reach this state they're at but way it's overlapped.

00:11:11: also on Ethiopia and Red Sea.

00:11:13: question is... The reason now looks like a broader regional picture.

00:11:20: And then of course you could throw in Somalia land as well Especially after Israel's recognition.

00:11:25: Alan, I

00:11:28: think that you've touched on just the ways in which the war in Sudan is drawing in Ethiopia and the wider region.

00:11:36: And like us to unpack a bit more... You talked about Yemen as well.

00:11:42: Yemen itself has broken up again right?

00:11:45: The four-year Saudi Houthi truce has this month cracked.

00:11:50: We have seen an Iranian flight into Sana'a cross Saudi red line, the airport runway was bombed.

00:11:59: The Houthis hit a Saudi Airport and now have declared a maritime blockade of their kingdom.

00:12:06: so are you seeing this as a collapse of no-war peace equilibrium that has held since hot Saudi Houthi front that is layered onto Iran's pressure on the Hormuz Strait.

00:12:24: What does it do to the security of entire Red Sea Corridor?

00:12:30: Well, these are still early days but obviously its hugely alarming.

00:12:34: I think the first thing to say clearly this a spillover from the Iran crisis and not something coming from within the political dynamics of The Horn and Red Sea on its own.

00:12:46: But if we see the Babelmandab Strait close again, on top of the closure already taking place in the Strait of Hormuz... I mean the first consequence will be towards those countries that sit actually on the red sea.

00:12:59: Of course you do have Saudi Arabia Arabian Peninsula side, but on the Horned Side you have Sudan Eritrea Djibouti which will be massively affected.

00:13:10: It'll hugely affect Egypt as well including through the revenue it earns from the Suez Canal.

00:13:17: so there'll be huge implications here in the region not only for imports But also for exports for some of these countries such as oil exports from Sudan.

00:13:25: So that'll be a huge consequence.

00:13:31: just result in the increasing securitization and increasing security approach towards the Red Sea, inevitably on both sides.

00:13:40: We did see during the war in Yemen previously when there was this Saudi-led coalition against the Houthis at its hottest.

00:13:48: you saw a lot of military activity on the Horn of Africa side related to that.

00:13:53: So you had, for instance a major UAE base in Eritrea which is now gone.

00:13:58: I think on the backs of that it's also when you started seeing these big investments For example in Somali land and Puntland not just commercially but security wise too from the UAE.

00:14:08: And Now You've seen this recognition From Israel towards Somali Land Which again looks Not Horn of Africa focused per se But Looks Yemen and Houthi Focused.

00:14:19: so what happens In Yemen doesn't stay in Yemen of Middle East countries, but also doesn't stay in Yemen for the Horn of Africa.

00:14:26: I think that exact fallout besides obviously economic and humanitarian ones is difficult to predict with any granularity.

00:14:34: But overall trend will definitely be deepening this sense of insecurity as a consequence further the security interventions that we're already seeing.

00:14:45: And I think a key question will be, Will we start to see more coordination and cooperation among various middle powers in the region on those security interventions?

00:14:55: Or will we see deepening competition and sometimes outright proxy conflict between

00:15:00: them?".

00:15:07: Right.

00:15:07: Quite a pertinent question there, and you did mention that what we're seeing in Sudan is the situation of that war potentially regionalizing into a genuine Red Sea proxy conflict?

00:15:20: I'm wondering which escalation pathways worries you most.

00:15:24: could it be real concern for Ethiopia being pulled through Benishangul Ghumuz?

00:15:30: Could it be the spillover to South Sudan The Eritrea question or the hardening partition around Kodofan, which of the dynamics really worries you most?

00:15:42: Well, all of these are very concerning.

00:15:44: I think they're too.

00:15:45: in particular that could prove the most destabilizing for the broader region beyond what it already is.

00:15:51: In some ways Sudan collapsed at the beginning and yes The army has retaken cartoon but clearly this state hasn't rebuilt itself.

00:15:59: So thats a domino.

00:16:00: in a sense That's already fallen But there are further developments that can destabilize even more beyond that.

00:16:09: And I think the major concern we have right now is very much centered in the Tigray region of northern Ethiopia, where we've seen the twenty-twenty two Pretoria cord That ended at that Tigray war.

00:16:23: Well if the Pretoria Cord it's still valid It's hanging by a thread so to speak but its clearly been severely challenged.

00:16:29: But the good news is that we haven't seen the outbreak of renewed war immediately, and clearly there's a reason for that coming from both the Ethiopian federal government.

00:16:38: And the TPLF—there are some strong disincentives against war but it would be foolish for anyone to bank on that holding on its own.

00:16:48: given the extreme bad blood and very high regional temperature because of the Sudan War largely The regional picture was much different than it was in twenty-twenty when the first two-grade war happened, which is very deadly on its own.

00:17:02: But now...in context of the Sudan War I don't think a new war in Tigrayf had re-erupted could be easily contained.

00:17:11: The TPLF has formed close alliance both with Eritrea but also with the Sudanese army and therefore arguably has links to the broader coalition that is supporting.

00:17:23: The Sudanese army as well, And of course Ethiopia Is a very close ally Of the UAE and there's been pretty open RSF activity happening in Northwestern Ethiopia too along the Sudan border.

00:17:36: so you're seeing already Ethiopian Sudan heading towards something That looks like an escalating potential proxy conflict.

00:17:45: if the war Tigray re-erupted, I think it would be very difficult to keep from getting sucked into those broader dynamics.

00:17:53: It also could prevent a spiral in Ethiopia and Eritrea relations given the way Eritreia is deeply involved with Tigray as well bad relations there, and so you would basically be looking at a potentially interconnected belt of conflicts.

00:18:13: Some would say from Yemen all the way across the Horn to Chad for instance.

00:18:18: but I think that key is what we're seeing not just these internal disputes in the horn.

00:18:23: because of how the war in Sudan has become regionalized So many regional powers into that war has intensified those rivalries so strongly.

00:18:35: That is now being overlaid, potentially on all these other disputes as well and therefore the risk Is essentially something like a wildfire when a spark is lit in one location It's becoming increasingly difficult to contain it in that location.

00:18:53: Alan As you are describing it its very interlinked region And you're describing the ways in which a conflict or an eruption of conflict, In one area can influence The whole region.

00:19:05: and I want to ask You about Somalia.

00:19:13: Somaliland, a move widely reported to have been facilitated by the UAE.

00:19:19: And I'm wondering what you think Israel's entry into the Horn means for Red Sea security or as you described it this securitization of The Red Sea and also What It Means For Somalia's sovereignty and territorial integrity?

00:19:36: So i Think This Is A prime Example Of The Major Concern disputes within the Horn of Africa, such as the long-standing dispute over Somaliland status.

00:19:50: All of a sudden getting entangled in these broader Middle East geopolitics in a way that massively intensifies the internal dispute.

00:19:59: so from Somali lands perspective it's been looking for recognition since the early nineties but especially And it finally had an opportunity to find a country that was willing to recognize, and of course Somaliland hoped and hopes other countries follow suit after Israel.

00:20:20: But how this played out is because of Israel's own relations with the region more specifically the Horn of Africa-Israel deep security partnership And the fact that Israel recognized Somali land, the same month you had this enormous rupture between the Saudis and Emiratis in Yemen which itself was partly a byproduct of these escalating tensions over the war on Sudan.

00:20:47: Because of all that what looked potentially to those in Har-Gesa like rather straightforward move immediately erupted into became part of these broader geopolitical regional dynamics in a way that I think surprised some of the local players.

00:21:05: And now you've seen because of that, for instance, the Saudis and others increase their own ties and relationships to the federal government of Somalia.

00:21:16: You see intense efforts to halt any other countries from recognizing Somali land And I think that sort of tug-of-war will continue.

00:21:26: Um, i think from Israel's perspective From the best of my understanding This is not really about The Horn Of Africa but it Is About The Houthis and Yemen.

00:21:36: but I think and we'll see whether or not Israel does start to deepen its ties across the Horn of Africa.

00:21:42: But in recent years, We haven't seen the Israelis very active in horn of africa politics although it It used to be much more active going back a few decades ago, but recently has not been.

00:21:53: so there's no sign yet that The Israeli recognition of Somalia land sort of shows A new interest from the israelis in the broader Horn of Afrika region.

00:22:03: instead what more done Is deep in this polarization that was already there, especially between a camp that includes the Saudis very prominently and then on the other side.

00:22:13: The Emiratis

00:22:14: Alan...the way you've painted the interconnectedness of various conflicts in the region has led to much analysis.

00:22:24: now even framing the region as two competing models On one hand is sort of Sovereign East Camp Egypt Saudi Arabia Turkey Qatar Mogadishu, Saf.

00:22:37: All of them set against what some now call an axis of secessionists right?

00:22:42: The UAE and Israel backing sub-state actors from the RSF to Somaliland to Puntland and Jubilan.

00:22:50: is this a useful way to read the map of that region then?

00:22:54: And in some sense does it flattened the agency of horn actors themselves and the older sort local roots of these disputes?

00:23:06: Well, I tend to find overarching narratives like that.

00:23:10: they tend to overfit the data and i think this is a prime example.

00:23:14: Of course there's something to that distinction between two different approaches The primary one being that UAE has clearly shown a willingness To have very deep relationship with sub-national actors.

00:23:29: And that's particularly true in the Somalia case where the UAE, especially in Putland and Somaliland have made major investments outside of the federal government of Somalia itself.

00:23:42: Of course it does have deep ties to Haftar for instance in Libya but I think really breaks down quite a bit as a broader narrative The Egyptians, the Saudis others deep ties to Haftar's administration in eastern Libya.

00:23:57: The RSF, I continue to believe in crisis groups.

00:24:01: analysis is that the RSF is not secessionist and the RS F continues to be a paramilitary heavily focused on recapturing national power in Sudan.

00:24:11: And it continues to our read.

00:24:12: of course the UAE relationship to the RSV predates the current war and Hometi was deputy sovereign council head in the military junta.

00:24:22: So I think that narrative is a bit off.

00:24:24: and then some of the UAE's bigger allies, of course have been state actors.

00:24:27: so It's deepest ally in the region Is the Ethiopian government?

00:24:32: And of course it's formed close ties with state actors across the region be that in the Chad or elsewhere as well.

00:24:39: and i should also say That we have another way more at less breakaway Or least rogue Region at the moment in The Horn of Africa And the TPLF, of course is not declared.

00:24:51: The TGRI's not declared its own independence or... anything yet, but is clearly currently outside the control of the federal government Of Ethiopia and Tigrayi is aligned to Eritrea And The Sunnis army.

00:25:05: Therefore it's more in the camp that some people are claiming as a Sovereignist Camp.

00:25:09: so I think you can see pretty quickly That these narratives Are quite flimsy once You poke around at them A bit?

00:25:14: And i also Think These Narratives Are Primarily Ones That Are Part information war as part of this bigger dispute that's taking place, so we should be careful about falling into specific narratives.

00:25:25: I think a lot of these factors have actually been contingent in the way and are quite fluid and could shift quite quickly.

00:25:34: Alan i would like to bring the conversation a little bit through the topic of agency.

00:25:39: A recurring theme in The Waza Project has been African Agency And As the Horn governments Are often portrayed pawns in someone else's game, in the game of external actors.

00:25:52: We also see that Horn State leaders are playing this rivalry for example through hedging ,through using leverage and through playing patrons off against one another.

00:26:05: How do you see this?

00:26:06: I'm thinking about Ethiopia's balancing act overseas access or Mogadishu willingness to snub Abu Dhabi, could you tell us a little bit more about how you see African agency being acted out?

00:26:22: Well clearly those who are sitting in the driver's seat and The Horn of Africa or the horn of africa leaders themselves.

00:26:28: I sometimes don't like the whole phrase About Agency because it almost sounds so trite.

00:26:33: Of course the primary agency rest with with the leaders themselves, and I think you've named some examples.

00:26:40: And we could deepen that in terms of leaders and capitals in the region that are very good about playing these various rivalries off each other as they have done for many decades in different geopolitical environments.

00:26:52: So I think Abiy Ahmed In Ethiopia is a good example.

00:26:56: He's too often portrayed As critics For instance someone who just takes orders from Abu Dhabi when I think anyone who knows Ethiopia well will realize that the prime minister is very much his own actor and is driven by his own ambitions.

00:27:15: And of course, his vision for Ethiopia as tied up in that... ...and he's shown a willingness.

00:27:20: For instance at one point He flew into Port Sudan and met with Urhan.

00:27:25: He pivoted From the MOU That he signed with Somali land and has made sure to keep his relationships, for instance with the leaders of Djibouti and Somalia despite this overall polarization that's taking place.

00:27:40: So the alliances in relationships among the Horn of Africa.

00:27:44: leaders are not easy to place in these oversimplified camps a sort-of Saudi led camp on one side or an Emirati lead Camp On The Other.

00:27:52: it is much more complicated than that.

00:27:56: Juba for instance South Sudan as another example be friends with none, but enemies of none in a way.

00:28:04: It's very instrumentalized and no one feels completely comfortable the relationship With Juba as being a pure ally of theirs, I think Kenya has also been very good historically at forging relationships across the spectrum to its own advantage.

00:28:21: The key issue here is less agency – it's ways in which entanglement with Middle East rivalries can amplify and intensify and worsen conflicts that are already there.

00:28:33: so we've seen this much during the war on Sudan.

00:28:36: I don't think the RSF is fighting the army and vice versa because of the positions of their outside patrons, but to the rivalry in disagreements.

00:28:44: And inability to come to common ground on the war in Sudan among the outside countries Is what is allowing this war in Sudan?

00:28:52: To continue to rage at this scale and continued to escalate and spill over into the rest of the region Right?

00:29:01: So the debate shouldn't be, in my opinion about whether or not there is agency on the horn side and who's in the driver seat.

00:29:08: The driver seats are clearly in the region itself but I think that doesn't mean that the broader concern of how this is getting entangled into a broader geopolitics should be dismissed.

00:29:19: it's huge factor making all these existing conflicts all the more dangerous, and I also have a specific worry that these broader rivalries are often quite fluid and difficult to fully understand from for instance The Horn of Africa side.

00:29:37: And by making this whole system much more complicated it increases the risks of miscalculation in which local or national actors make decisions based off of disputes that sometimes go back decades, but are now the decisions taking place in this much more highly charged regional context.

00:29:56: And I think it makes them harder to predict consequences for what taking a certain action might be.

00:30:04: Alan...I do quite like the framing of African agency in these contexts and you've often pointed on our separate but related note by a largely absent United States in the region as a de-escalator.

00:30:22: In a more multipolar horn, Gulf states Turkey Israel China Russia all of them are present at once.

00:30:31: what does that absence of the U.S really mean for how the region is governed?

00:30:36: do you see any life left in african led frameworks whether it's within the African Union EGAD or The Red Sea Council which has things stand can even seat all the relevant players.

00:30:49: Yeah, well we've made it this far into the conversation without really talking much about the US.

00:30:56: in some ways you could sum up a lot of the changes talking about declining role of the

00:31:04: U.S.,

00:31:04: and as you can see, You also make it a long ways into conversation before even mentioning The US.

00:31:10: so I think we cant ignore It.

00:31:12: We also cant probably overstate the ultimate influence Of the u.s going back a couple decades or now in the horn.

00:31:19: i think what we Can say clearly is that the Horn of Africa Is one of places That getting destabilized from this shift From the unipolar era that followed Cold War to A much more messy, some would say multipolar but you know a more complicated world and that is affecting the Horn of Africa because the U.S was for a period then not too long of a period.

00:31:42: I think.

00:31:43: sometimes we think this period lasted much longer than it did But before a period The US wasn't able to resolve wars And sometimes worsened them in the horn of africa around peacemaking and stabilization efforts.

00:31:59: Again, sometimes not for the better.

00:32:01: in Somalia For instance The US backing of Ethiopia's invasion Produced the al-Shabaab insurgency more or less that we're currently seeing.

00:32:11: the us backing of South Sudan's independence Clearly has a knock on well for south Sudan or Sudan And you can keep going down the list Further, but this disarray that we have seen especially over the last decade in which a war breaks out and you don't have any immediate peace process instead.

00:32:30: You have a competition among various multilateral institutions along various regional powers for peace process.

00:32:38: That sense there is no center of gravity anymore about a lead on stabilization efforts, that's something much more recent.

00:32:47: Now you can debate the overall importance of how much is a prime cause for instability in this region or not but also the interventions coming from regional powers.

00:32:59: some was going to come regardless whether US maintained a more global hegemonic position just because these are rising powers in their own who want influence and need influence near abroad.

00:33:15: But there was also an element of the US pulling back, pivoting towards Asia growing less interest in The Horn of Africa that I think further sucked into these regional powers and made it more existential.

00:33:28: In a way they stay involved with The Horn Of Africa And get more involved.

00:33:33: That has been a spiral which we haven't seen yet in terms of that as well.

00:33:38: So I think these broader geopolitical shifts have been a great consequence to the Horn, and they are obviously complicated as well.

00:33:45: The one thing is very interesting about the Horn of Africa.

00:33:48: compared pretty much any other region in the world Is it's a place surrounded by middle powers That out punch superpowers.

00:34:01: If you say China Russia and the US as dominant global powers, The Horn of Africa is of interest to all three of them but it's not on their top priority list.

00:34:14: It's more a nice-to-have probably for all of them whereas when you look at where BRICS expanded more recently And you have numerous countries in this Red Sea region who are major You could call the middle powers in the world and they're interested in the horn is substantial enough that their interventions outweigh from the superpowers.

00:34:35: And I think that's where you have this very chaotic mix at the moment.

00:34:39: anyways, we have numerous interventions coming for multiple corners and a sense that kind of no one is in charge

00:34:53: to diplomacy, you are mentioning the lack of a coordination framework.

00:34:59: Is there an architecture regional or maybe external that is capable of managing or resolving?

00:35:05: Maybe even the overlapping crises that we mentioned and We also made it this far into the conversation without really mentioning Europe.

00:35:15: So do see any credible role for Europe Germany specifically as a potential convening actor in the Horn?

00:35:24: First of all, on Europe.

00:35:27: To me it would look like The Horn Of Africa has to be considered a nearby region and strategic region for Europe not only because of the Red Sea, but also just by sheer proximity.

00:35:41: And again I think this is a case where the Pax Americana or unipolar moment that preceded this perhaps allowed Europeans to underweight the importance of The Horn of Africa Because the US was largely in the lead.

00:35:56: But geographically speaking The Horn Of Africa looks like it matters much more To Europe than the

00:36:02: U.S.,

00:36:02: so I think there's some rebalancing, that should be occurring of course... There is a historical legacy of colonialism which is very real one and complicates matters but also doesn't mean what i already said isn't true.

00:36:18: Which is Europe in close proximity to the Horn of Africa And should consider it more strategically than from my conversations in various European capitals suggests that it does, and beyond just a pure humanitarian lens as well.

00:36:32: It should see it in a broader geopolitical lens aswell.

00:36:37: And I think Europe at the moment is not really seen as major geopolitical player In the region...it's seen to be a major donor A major diplomatic player but i think its still building up.

00:36:50: its geopolitical weight so-to speak does the basic structure of EU and difficulty in having united European foreign policy as part.

00:37:00: I think it's a work-in-progress on the European side, but Europe needs to invest more strategically speaking have a major stake, so Europe will have to be serious to make an impact in the Horn.

00:37:25: I think especially as-as The US role probably continues to decline.

00:37:30: and now what is a regional coordination mechanism look like?

00:37:33: In the future...I Think there won't be a clear and clean one.

00:37:38: um i think we're clearly entering chaotic period when some ways things are falling apart before they start to be pieced back together again.

00:37:47: The positive note is that in some ways countries I think will have and regional powers, we'll have to start coordinating more with each other because if they don't the result will be terrible for everyone which is just deepening and broadening instability and crises.

00:38:05: now of course the worry the necessity of such coordination really sink in.

00:38:14: But a more hopeful take would be that, yes this is a transitional period.

00:38:18: it'll be a bit messy but over time regional powers will have to coordinate more.

00:38:25: we'll have to be better at communicating and respecting red lines or else no one wins right?

00:38:31: Or else we see more conflicts like Sudan.

00:38:34: So one hopes that the war in Sudan could be a cautionary tale, and hopefully we don't see another war like this soon.

00:38:42: but of course it might also be hopeful.

00:38:46: so I think we'll have to wait and see... But overall trajectory will need more direct coordination among regional powers about their interventions on the Horn of Africa.

00:39:01: such as necessarily, you know African Union coordinating with the Arab League or EGAD and GCC.

00:39:09: Or The Red Sea Council per se.

00:39:10: I think it'll probably be more ad hoc than that at least to begin With but i think That's clearly where things will need To head right?

00:39:19: As a final question Alan let me ask You for your prediction.

00:39:23: If we look to the next few years What is the one dynamic in the region?

00:39:30: You think policymakers, businesses, analysts should be watching far more closely than they are.

00:39:38: The thing that is most likely to catch everyone off guard?

00:39:42: Well I think the trend of how integrated the horn is becoming in the Gulf and the wider Middle East region... ...I think it's still perhaps underappreciated meaning i think at which it is taking place, even though everyone—even now that's a dominant narrative.

00:40:02: I do think the speed of these regions integrating with each other still catches policymakers off guard and frankly basic bureaucracies, for instance in a lot of foreign ministries is just not well set up yet even despite this trend to deal with it.

00:40:19: Those who deal with the Gulf don't know anything about the Horn of Africa and those that work on the Horn africa often have little access or ability directly speak with them.

00:40:31: so there's quite divide I think at speed so to speak, will outpace.

00:40:37: It looks like they're outpacing any sort of reforms that will come down the line.

00:40:40: but The other major dispute That I think often gets overlooked amid all this is one thats well known But i think perhaps is less sexy amid All these very fluid golf dynamics etc.

00:40:53: And Thats the long standing rivalry and enmity in competition between Egypt & Ethiopia Which does now overlay with These Other Broader Disputes I think still underappreciated in the way that it has really poisoned the atmosphere on numerous key disputes and some sort of thaw or handshake, resolution to... That deep antagonism would go a long way towards lowering temperature for the Nile Basin.

00:41:30: Alan?

00:41:30: I couldn't agree more with you when we talk about the divide between on the one hand, the horn actors and the golf not knowing each other that well.

00:41:42: I'm actually speaking to you from Cambridge where over the last few days have been attending the Golf Research Meeting And that divide is even clearer.

00:41:52: in conversations We could go on-and-on but Alan thank you so much for joining us For such a clear-eyed tour of our region as always inner flocks.

00:42:05: Thanks so much for having me and congratulations on the new podcast!

00:42:09: Thank you very much Alan, to our listeners thank you for joining us And don't forget to follow Carpo on LinkedIn and Instagram To stay up-to-date in future episodes.